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Abstract
Macroscopic objects appear to have definite positions. In a many-
worlds interpretation of quantum theory, this appearance is an illusion;
the correct view is the “view from outside” in which even macroscopic
objects are in general in a superposition of different positions. In the
Bohm model, objects really are in definite positions. This additional
aspect of reality is accessible only from the “inside”; thus in the Bohm
model the view from inside can be more correct than is the view from
outside.
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Quantum mechanics is an enormously successful theory. There has been
experimental verification of quantum predictions for processes involving dis-
tances ranging from about 10−16 cm (photoproduction in p¯p scattering, ref.
[1]) to about 10 km (Bell’s inequality for entangled photons, ref [2]). The
successes of quantum mechanics come in spite of the fact that the most
straightforward interpretation of one of the most fundamental aspects of
quantum theory—the linear evolution implied by the Schro¨dinger equation—
would lead one to expect the existence of superpositions of macroscopically-
distinguishable states, in complete contradiction to the way the world ap-
pears to us to be. This discrepancy between naive prediction and apparent
observation can be “resolved” by postulating that the state-vector experi-
ences “collapse” as well as Schro¨dinger evolution. However, in this paper
I will discuss other interpretations of quantum theory, interpretations in
which there is no such collapse, and in which the state-vector does indeed
evolve exactly as dictated by the Schro¨dinger equation.
The seeming implausibility of the existence of superpositions of
macroscopically-distinguishable states is vividly illustrated by the story of
Schro¨dinger’s cat [3]. As the title of this paper implies, I want to discuss
what someone in the position of the cat in that story might know, and for
this purpose I will suppose that a cat can be aware of himself and of his
surroundings, just as a person might be. Any reader unable to imagine such
a sentient cat can just substitute the word “human” for “cat” wherever it
appears in this discussion. However, since I doubt that my reader’s credulity
would extend to the case of a sentient dead cat, I will alter the story some-
what, so that the two possibilities for the cat correspond to being in two
different positions, rather than to life or death.
So here is the story which I wish to discuss. An experimenter, whom I
will identify as being Schro¨dinger himself, places into a box a cat, together
with a radioactive sample, such that perhaps in the course of an hour one
of the atoms decays, but also, with equal probability, perhaps none do. The
cat has been trained so that, at the end of the hour, if there has been a
decay he moves to the left side of the box, but if there has not been any
decay he moves to the right side. After placing the cat and the sample in
the box, Schro¨dinger seals the box and never does look inside again, so that
the contents of the box constitute an isolated system once the box is closed.
Let B denote the system consisting of the contents of the box (the cat
and the radioactive atoms), and let |ψ〉 be the state-vector for that system.
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For the time tinitial when the box is first closed, we can write
|ψ(tinitial)〉 = |atoms, initial〉|cat, initial〉. (1)
I wish to discuss the situation within the box at a time after the hour has
passed, which I will refer to simply as time t. I am supposing that the
state-vector of a system, even one containing macroscopic and/or sentient
components, never experiences collapse, so I write
|ψ(t)〉 = 1√
2
(|atom decayed〉|cat at left〉+ |no atom decayed〉|cat at right〉).
(2)
We could if we wished write a state-vector for the combined system consist-
ing of B together with Schro¨dinger, but that state-vector would simply be
the product of |ψ(t)〉 as given in eq. (2) and the state-vector for Schro¨dinger.
Now, at time t it will certainly appear to the cat that it is in a definite
position (just as it appears to each of us that we are in a definite position),
although the state-vector in eq. (2) indicates a superposition of different
positions. As suggested by its title, this paper is devoted to a discussion,
using the example of Schro¨dinger’s cat, of the following question: Does the
appearance of a definite position correspond to some truth (as opposed to
being an illusion), and if so, is this a truth which could also be known by
an outside observer? I will examine the answers to this question in two
versions of no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics. One version
is the many-worlds interpretation [4] in which the state-vector is taken to
represent a complete description of a system. The other version assumes
that the state-vector description is not complete; I will discuss in particular
the interpretation given by de Broglie [5] and by Bohm [6] (which I will
call simply the Bohm model), but similar considerations would presumably
apply to, e.g., the modal interpretations of refs. [7].
I shall take the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics [4] to
be based on the following two assertions:
• Completeness: The state of an isolated system is completely de-
scribed by a Hilbert-space vector (which I will denote by |ψ〉).
• No collapse: The state-vector |ψ〉 evolves according to the Schro¨dinger
equation
H|ψ〉 = ih¯ ∂
∂t
|ψ〉. (3)
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Since in our story Schro¨dinger has prepared the initial state of the system
B, we may assume that he know its initial state-vector, as given in eq. (1).
Then if he knows the rate of decay of the atoms and the way the cat has
been trained (i. e., if he knows the Hamiltonian for B) he can use eq. (3) to
calculate |ψ(t)〉 for the later time t. Thus we may assume that Schro¨dinger
knows the state vector |ψ(t)〉, even though he does not interact with the
system B after the initial time.
We can also imagine that the cat knows the state vector |ψ(t)〉, for it
too might know how the system was prepared and might be able to solve
eq. (3). That would be an example of an inhabitant of one “branch” of
the many-world state-vector being aware of the existence of another branch,
but that is certainly allowed in the many-worlds interpretation.2 For a more
realistic example, consider an experimenter who prepares an electron in an
eigenstate of Sx and then measures its value of Sz to be +
1
2
h¯. Since she
remembers how the spin was originally prepared, she knows (if she is an
adherent of the many-worlds interpretation) that there is another branch in
which Sz was measured to be −12 h¯.
However, the fact that the cat might be thought to know as much as
does Schro¨dinger does not address the question which forms the title of this
paper, which is whether the cat can know something which Schro¨dinger does
not. Although a great deal can be said about what the cat might know (see
for example ref. [9]), it is not necessary to address that issue to answer our
question within the many-worlds context, for the following reason:
We have seen that Schro¨dinger, even without interacting with the system
B after its initial preparation, can know the state-vector |ψ(t)〉, and in the
many-worlds interpretation there is nothing else to know. Thus Schro¨dinger
knows everything (by which I mean everything about B, of course), and
therefore there is nothing else for the cat to know. Conversely, any inter-
pretation in which there is anything beyond the state-vector for the cat to
know necessarily violates the completeness assertion which I have taken to
be part of the definition of the many-worlds interpretation. Thus, without
even examining the issue of what the cat might know, we see that the many-
worlds interpretation gives a negative answer to the question posed in the
title; the cat does not know anything that Schro¨dinger does not know.
The Bohm model [5, 6] subscribes to the “no collapse” but not the “com-
pleteness” assertion of the many-worlds interpretation. Instead, it is asserted
2Vaidman [8] fancifully describes a single particle which inhabits one branch and yet is
aware of the existence of another branch.
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that each particle has, at each time, a definite value of a position variable;
I will refer to this as the “Bohm position” of the particle (and by the Bohm
position of an extended object I will mean the center-of-mass of the Bohm
positions of the object’s constituent particles). It is also generally assumed
that for macroscopic objects the observed position coincides with the Bohm
position. Logically, there is another option: to formally ascribe a Bohm
position to each particle, but when it comes to interpreting the formalism,
to completely ignore the Bohm positions and to proceed as one would in a
many-worlds interpretation. Since neither I nor anyone that I know of favors
this option, I will not pursue it further, and will thus take the Bohm model
to include the specification that, for macroscopic objects, the observed po-
sition is indeed the Bohm position.3 For definiteness, let me say that the
Bohm position of the cat in our story, is, at time t, at the left. Then we can
say that the cat really is at the left, and that the cat knows (correctly) that
he is at the left. In saying this, I am certainly not attempting to construct
any theory of consciousness, nor to say how it is that we (or a cat) come
to know anything. I am merely combining the obvious remark that we do,
after all, perceive ourselves to be in definite locations with the feature of the
Bohm model that this perception is considered to be correct.
One might make the following objection to this: if we say that the cat
represented by the first term on the right-hand side of eq. (2) (correctly)
sees himself as being at the left, should we not also say that the other cat
in the second term (incorrectly) sees himself at the right? This objection
has no force within the Bohm model. There is no “other” cat; the cat really
is at the left, even though there are two terms in the state-vector. One
also might worry that, since Bohm positions can influence each other non-
locally, the Bohm model might provide some way for Schro¨dinger to learn
that the cat is at the left without his having to look in the box. But of
course this does not happen: since Schro¨dinger and the system B are in
a non-entangled state (i.e., the joint state-vector is a product), the Bohm
position of any part of B is independent of the Bohm position of any part of
Schro¨dinger. In fact, if Schro¨dinger were to look inside the box, it would not
be to learn what |ψ(t)〉 is (he already knows that), but rather to entangle
himself with B so that he might know the Bohm position of the cat. So,
since in our story Schro¨dinger does not look inside the box, and therefore
3As pointed out by Englert et al. [10] for microscopic objects there are situations
in which the Bohm position does not correspond to what one might have expected the
position to be. For macroscopic objects this situation does not arise.
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does not become entangled with B, we can conclude that Schro¨dinger does
not know that the cat is at the left. But the cat does know. So the Bohm
model allows a positive answer to the question posed in the title: the cat
does know something that Schro¨dinger does not know.
We have seen that the two interpretations I have discussed give different
answers to our title question. In the many-worlds interpretation the cat
could perhaps know as much as does Schro¨dinger, but certainly not more,
since Schro¨dinger knows everything; in the Bohm model there is something
to be known beyond what Schro¨dinger knows, and that something can indeed
be known by the cat. Let me conclude with the following three remarks:
First remark. I have certainly not attempted to provide any explanation
for human (or feline!) consciousness. The cat in the story could have been
replaced by a device which moves left or right and which contains an internal
pointer which indicates the position of the device. Then the term |cat at left〉
in eq. (2) could be replaced by |device at left, pointer points left〉, with an
analogous replacement for |cat at right〉. What makes the many-worlds in-
terpretation viable is that the resulting |ψ(t)〉 would then show a correlation
between the position of the device and the indication of the pointer. One
might perhaps maintain that, in the context of a many-worlds interpreta-
tion, this correlation itself allows us to say that the pointer “knows” the
location of the device (see for example ref. [9]), but in any case since the
state-vector |ψ(t)〉 and hence this correlation are known to Schro¨dinger, we
would still not say that the pointer “knows” something that Schro¨dinger
does not. In the Bohm model, the device really would be at the left, and
the pointer really would point left, but Schro¨dinger would not know that.
Second remark. Here is a different version of the story I have been dis-
cussing. This morning I flipped a quantum coin, to determine whether I
should work in my office this afternoon, or whether I should go outside for a
walk instead. Therefore, my wave function this afternoon has support both
in my office and on the walking paths outside.4 In fact, here I am working,
and so I know that my Bohm position is here in the office. My colleague,
who is familiar with my practice of consulting that coin but has not seen me
today, does perhaps know my wave function, but does not know my Bohm
position.
Is this at all surprising? In the Bohm model, the situation is simply that
4More accurately, support of the wave function of the entangled system consisting of
me and the coin includes values of my position variable both inside and outside.
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I see where I am, but my colleague does not see me, so of course I know
something that my colleague does not know. What perhaps is surprising
is that, in the many-worlds interpretation, I don’t know anything unknown
to my colleague, since there are no “facts” beyond those represented in the
wave function.
Last remark. Returning now to the first version of the story with the
cat, we have said that, since according to eq. (3) the state-vector evolves
deterministically, knowledge of the state-vector of system B at the initial
time is sufficient for knowledge at the later time t. This is in contrast to
interpretations in which the state-vector can suffer collapse; in those inter-
pretations, knowledge of the initial state-vector is not sufficient, so that an
additional measurement would be required. Of course Schro¨dinger did have
to interact with the system B in order to prepare it in its initial state, but
after that initial interaction, he can simply calculate |ψ〉 at any later time.
So |ψ(t)〉 might be said to represent “public” reality which is accessible to
anyone who knows its initial value. And in the many-worlds interpretation,
that is all the reality there is. In the Bohm model, there is an additional
aspect to reality, namely the Bohm positions. The Bohm model is also de-
terministic, but Schro¨dinger does not know the Bohm position of the cat at
time t because (although he did prepare the initial state of B) he does not
know well enough the initial Bohm positions. So this additional aspect of
reality is only accessible from within the system B.
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